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ABSTRACT 
 
This research is focused on the problem of congestion at locks on the inland waterways of the 
United States, and particularly on the Mississippi and Illinois Rivers.  The current policy of 
first-come-first-served exacerbates the problem and adds to delays and inefficiency.  An 
alternative policy of marketable priority access permits is proposed and studied.  The 
dimensions of the policy relative to the needs of operators are discussed.  Well established 
economic theory suggests that the system of marketable priority permits will increase the 
economic efficiency with which locks operate and that by the endowing of current operators 
with these permits will increase their profitability. A testbed experiment was conducted to 
illustrate how the principles operate.  The policy objective of increased efficiency is observed 
thereby establishing proof of principle.  More importantly, the policy works according to all of 
the many predictions that theory holds thereby establishing design consistency. Not only is the 
value of system use increased, prices converge to the competitive levels, the removal of delay 
for certain classes of permits  transforms system use to higher valued activities and operator 
profitability is increased.  In the testbed, the policy produces the desired outcomes and it does 
so for understandable reasons. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Locks on the inland waterways of the United States are experiencing outages due to 
mechanical failures with increasing frequency.  The “run down” state of the locks, particularly 
on the Mississippi – where many of the locks date back to the administration of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, has attracted the attention of international press.2  The U.S. House of 
Representatives has approved a budget of over $2 billion to expand and upgrade the locks.3  
Some question the effect on the environment and the need for such expenditure if recent figures 
of reduced congestion and delay accurately reflect a decrease demand for commercial use of 
the river.4  Of course, the demand for commercial use of the river is not independent of the 
quality of the locks.  Increased congestion, particularly around unplanned outages, can increase 
uncertainty about the delivery time and make it difficult for river carriers to compete effectively 
with other forms of transport. 
The research reported here is focused on the problem of congestion, and concomitant 
delays, that occur at the locks on inland waterways.  The research focused on the construction 
of a testbed experiment that would implement a proposed policy, and explore its effects.  In 
addition, congestion is a growing problem; one that has grown as increased commerce and 
economic progress have placed a swelling demand on infrastructures, including public roads, 
public parks and beaches, the internet, and private railways.  The research, therefore, also 
serves as an example that illustrates the common economic issues and helps point the way 
toward the solutions.    
Two broad questions are asked of the experimental testbed.5
(i) In an environment with the essential elements of the fundamental congestion 
problem, does the proposed policy militate against the ill effects and solve the 
problem?  This type of question is known as one of “proof of principle”.  A 
representative form of this question might be:  “Does the policy work?” Does the 
policy provide the desired result?  If the policy does not do so in a simple case then, 
                                                 
2 “The Nightmare Continues,” The Economist (October 13, 2005). 
3 “The Nightmare Continues,” The Economist (October 13, 2005). 
4 “The Nightmare Continues,” The Economist (October 13, 2005). 
5This methodology was introduced by Plott (1994). 
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the underlying ideas that motivated it are called into question and should be 
reexamined. 
(ii) The second question is one of “design consistency”.  A representative form of that 
question might be:  “Does the policy work for understandable reasons?” That is, 
does the policy operate in accord with the basic economic principles upon which the 
design rests?   It is possible that “desirable” outcomes were produced by accident or 
random luck and if so there would be no reason to have confidence that the 
performance of the policy would be robust and produce the desired result if 
implemented at complexity and scale.  The test of design consistency is a control for 
such possible sources of error.   
The report is organized in six sections.  The first section provides this introduction. 
Sections II and III provide the context of the problem and an overview of policy solutions that 
have been discussed.  Section IV contains the institutional details of a proposed policy of 
tradable priority permits that guarantees an advantaged placement in the queue of commercial 
vessels for access to a lock.  Lower numbers imply a higher level of priority. For example, 
holders of priority one permits pass through the lock before those with permits where the 
priority level is a higher number, even if they joined the queue earlier.  A policy testbed is 
developed in Section V. The role of the testbed is limited as the basic economic principles on 
which the policy rests are well-known.  The testbed is only used to demonstrate that the 
principles operate together as naturally presupposed by the policy, and the testbed is 
sufficiently transparent so as to illustrate that to those with little or no background in 
economics. Thus, the testbed combines many interrelated parts, each providing its own basis 
for comparison, into an integrated experimental session. An examination of the data 
demonstrates that each of these interrelated parts operated as theory would anticipate for the 
policy, both separately and collectively.  Section VI contains the quantitative predictions of the 
model when applied to the testbed and Section VII contains the results that support the 
applicability of the policy.  Section VIII, the final section, contains a summary of conclusions. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Lock outages and demand spikes are sources of congestion that can lead to delays for 
commercial traffic on inland waterways.  Even when the outages are scheduled for 
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maintenance, the outage can lead to significant delays.  For example, scheduled maintenance 
can lead to the discovery of additional work, unexpectedly lengthening the duration of the 
outage and perhaps leading to a complete shutdown.6    
Delays create additional costs for the carriers, both direct costs and indirect costs 
derivative of the uncertainty they generate for delivery times.  Direct costs include those 
associated with the additional time spent waiting in the queue.  Indirect costs include business 
lost to other methods of transport and potentially less valuable contracts, as firms using the 
transport service that carriers on the inland waterways provide often demand timely delivery to 
maintain operations.7  For delays that can be anticipated, firms like these may try to increase 
their inventories as a buffer against less reliable deliveries during the delay period.8  Of course, 
this may only lead to a worsening of the situation by increasing the demands on the system.  
Net these costs can lead to both a shifting of business to other forms of transport or increased 
transportation fees.   
III.  POLICY OPTIONS AND ISSUES 
In 2000, the US Department of Defense commissioned a review of a study made by the 
US Army Corps of Engineers of feasibility of the current navigation system of the inland 
waterways.9  The resulting committee report, sometimes referred to as the “NRC” report, 
encouraged further study of two non-structural measures that might improve the congestion 
problem, in particular:  (1) tradable permits (particularly, “transferable titles to lockage slots”) 
                                                 
6 Consider the case of the Greenup lock on the Ohio River, where the closure that was planned to last 18 days 
stretched to over 52 days because of the extensive damage found and the risk of gate failure.  This closure caused 
an average tow delay of 37.5 hours  As the locks have aged, particularly over the last decade or so, the number of 
scheduled and unscheduled hours of outage has increased.  See Planning Center for Expertise for Inland 
Navigation, Huntington District (February 2005).   
7 Tirschwell (March 14, 2005) (“‘Each shipper has its own manufacturing schedule, but in general the cutoff date 
is less material than predictability,’ said John Isbell, director of corporate delivery logistics for Nike”). 
8 Watson (July 15, 2004) (“[C]argo … has increased 7.1 percent this year, with delays creating ‘a degree of 
uncertainty and higher costs for companies’” and, without sufficiently close substitutes, “‘[c]ompanies may have 
to put more inventory in the pipeline’”). 
9 Committee to Review the Upper Mississippi River-Illinois Waterway Navigation System Feasibility Study; 
Water Science and Technology Board; Division on Earth and Life Studies; Transportation Research Board; 
National Research Council, “Inland Navigation System Planning: The Upper Mississippi River—Illinois 
Waterway,”  National Academy Press, Washington DC, 2001, p. 13 (hereinafter the “NRC report”). 
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and (2) reservation system for a sequence of locks based on arrival at an initial lock.10  Our 
interest is in the former of these types of market-based measures.     
The broadest use of marketable permits may be in the area of environmental policy.  
Anderson (EPA 2001) provides a survey of various types of economic incentive schemes used, 
particularly by the US Environmental Protection Agency, to further environmental goals, 
including tradable permit programs.  Stavins (2003) also surveys a number of market-based 
policy instruments for environmental purposes, including tradable permits, and concluding that 
market-based instruments are of increasing importance.  Similarly, Montero (2004) argues that, 
while not having fully replaced “command-and-control” policies, “permit markets are expected 
to play an increasing role in the solution of environmental problems in the future.”11   
However, marketable permits have also been used to solve problems of congestion in 
the transportation sector, including airport landing rights, or “slots” and, similar station rights 
for railways.12  This study, similar to Plott and Porter (1996), looks at tradable interests in 
priority rights rather than to exclusive use at a specified time.13  As in the case of other 
waterways, such as the Panama Canal, there is a system of priorities in place – where, e.g., 
military vessels can move ahead of commercial vessels; however, such priorities are not 
generally tradable.14
Any policy designed to reduce the costs of congestion is forced to confront a number of 
constraining factors.  Perhaps the most important of these are:  (1) the industry’s reliance on 
flexibility in scheduling in order to respond effectively to a variety of external forces and (2) 
variability in the costs of delay across carriers and shipment contracts.  In addition, policies are 
more useful if they provide a means to measure the costs of the delays or the value of 
increasing the capacity of a lock. 
                                                 
10 NRC report (2001), pp. 66-71 
11 Montero (August 2004), p. 2.   
12 In the case of airlines, see, Grether, Isaac, and Plott (May 1981); in the case of railroads, see, e.g., Cox, 
Offerman, Olsen, and Schram (2002). 
13 See also Wilson (1993) for a discussion of pricing the provision of electricity with different levels of acceptable 
interruption when demand is uncertain and service unreliable.  
14 See, CBFenton (1998). Generally, the Panama Canal’s priority system uses two principal means of access to the 
locks: (1) a reservation system for a certain number of slots for priority access and (2) the authority of the 
lockmaster to let any ship “be moved through the Canal on a priority basis.”  See CBFenton § 104.5 
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Previous considerations included a variety of policies that were not market-based.  
Lockage fees might be charged for the use of a lock and that charge might be higher at periods 
of peak use, or additional fees might be added for a “slow” lockage.15  However, systems that 
penalize “slow” lockages were set aside, as the length of the lockage may influenced by factors 
beyond the control of the operators, such as weather conditions.  Similarly, systems using 
fixed-time appointments were less attractive.  Moreover, the general appeal flexibility made 
command and control systems unlikely to be the most useful line of inquiry.  A tradable 
priority permit system suggested itself as likely to best serve the objectives of reducing the 
costs of congestion, including costs associated with uncertainty and providing a means to 
measure the value of increased lock capacity.   
A policy of tradable permits for priority access to locks on the inland waterways can 
conform to the constraining factors and offer the desired benefits.  Unlike fixed appointments 
policies, such a policy increases flexibility in shipping schedules as each party is able to decide 
whether to exercise, sell or hold their priority permits, which were previously not available.  It 
also allows shipments with costlier delays to move through at a priority, increasing the 
efficiency of the system, while not necessarily increasing the number of lockages per day or the 
number of vessels, or tug-barge combinations that moved through a lock each day.  Such a 
policy reduces the uncertainty associated with the position one may get in the queue so as to aid 
in operators’ abilities to improve their business arrangements and pursue more time sensitive 
shipments.  It also increases operator profits by increasing the flexibility of the operator to 
respond to changing market conditions, allowing the operators to better compete with 
alternative means of transport by reducing the uncertainties associated with delivery conditions, 
and allowing the operators to expand the set of contracts they can profitably undertake.  The 
priority permits are a ready means of responding to congestion, including extended or 
unscheduled outages at a lock and valuing increases in lock capacity.  Finally, the system has 
the advantage of being similar to industry self-help.  See Appendix A for excerpts from a 
meeting with industry discussing the closure of the McAlpine Lock. 
A policy of tradable priority permits is consistent with and similar to self-adopted 
industry policies to meet temporary difficulties; however, institutionalization of the system will 
                                                 
15  See, Stavins (2003) and Volpe, (2003). 
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provide for a quicker response time and broader application.  Commercial users of the inland 
waterways are familiar with priority systems and have found them beneficial to help resolve 
congestion in the past.16  However, because in the past these solutions have been ad hoc, the 
benefits are not maximized.  Motivations for the use of priorities include limits on the sources 
of or storage capacity for inputs of some customers and their need for a continuous supply to 
remain in operation.17  Managing the uncertainty associated with delivery and with the negative 
outcomes that may ensue, including the closure of some plants dependent on supplies of inputs 
over the waterways and the exercise “transportation risk management,” become of increasing 
significance.18  While not an “easy task” for the industry to take on an ad hoc basis, the benefits 
seem clear.19
IV.  TRADABLE PRIORITY PERMITS:  POLICY DETAIL 
The recommendation is to create a system of tradable priority permits that will be issued 
to existing river barge operators in proportion to existing and historical operations on the river.  
The major features of the instrument and policy variables are as follows. 
A. Rights of the holder 
A permit will give to the holder the right to move ahead of all vessels waiting for access 
to the lock and traveling in the same direction, up to the holder of a permit in the queue being 
exercised with equal rights.  That is, the function of the instrument is not to govern access to or 
use of a lock.  It only serves to alter the order from one of “first come first served” where there 
are several potential users in queue for a lock but with different waiting costs.  The permits 
would only alter the order of access among commercial traffic; the existing priorities governing 
non-commercial traffic would be unchanged.   
B. The Master Instrument 
The tradable priority permits are instruments with two principal components:  (1) the 
master instrument and (2) the two-week permits.  The master instrument provides the holder a 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., USACE Meeting (May 27, 2004), pp. 64-5: “So probably very soon, we'll probably try to put a 
working group together. We may look to some outside resource also to help manage that process. So, I guess 
unless we - FROM THE FLOOR: We've done this a lot of times. INGRAM1: Yeah, we have done this before.”
17 USACE Meeting (May 27, 2004), p. 61 
18 USACE Meeting (May 27, 2004), p. 60. 
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perpetual stream of two-week permits for the life of the program.  So, the holder of a master 
instrument for a given lock will be reissued each year the same tradable priority permits for the 
26 two-week periods unless and until the master instrument is sold.   
C. Marketability 
The instruments will be marketable and transferable.  Either the master instrument or 
one or more of the two-week permits it generates can be marketed and sold.  Sales of the latter 
do not affect the ownership and control of the master instrument.  One may sell priority permits 
that are not expected to be used or not highly valued to others, while retaining the master 
instrument and, therefore, the ongoing stream of priority permits in the future.   
D. Permit validity and timing 
Permits will be designated as “Upstream” or “Downstream.”  The permits will be lock 
specific and have a limited life.  The life of the permit will be sufficiently long and the grant of 
permits overlapping so that the flexibility of vessel operators is maintained.  For example, a 
permit might be valid for use within a given two-week period with other permits beginning 
(and ending) their useful life at the end of the first week.  In fact, this “overlapping” structure of 
instruments will add flexibility for vessel owners to meet unforeseen changes that occur during 
a voyage.  Still, the number of permits of a given priority available to be exercised at any time 
is limited, so savings in delay costs are still achieved. 
The queues, “Upstream” and “Downstream,” are treated separately.  The current 
procedures by which the lock masters allocate between upstream and downstream traffic is not 
altered by this proposal, in part, because the congestion is understood to be typically one-
way.20  However, if a priority needed to be viewed as a queue for use of the lock regardless of 
direction, that can easily be addressed by, as one alternative, avoiding the distinction between 
upstream and downstream priority and making one unified priority not conditioned on 
                                                                                                                                                           
(...continued)  
19 USACE Meeting (May 27, 2004), p. 60. 
20 There appears to be some understanding in the industry that multiple one-way locks assist in relieving 
congestion at locks. USACE Meeting, at pp. 56-57 (May 27, 2004) (“I guess one of the questions that the 
Colonel asked is do you use traditional first come first serve or do you use multiple one-way lockages. And my 
response to that is based on a lot of the queuing theory things that the industry has looked at over the years and 
worked with the Corps, we have found that multiple one-way lockage permits us to move more cargos through 
the lock.”)  
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direction.  Such would, of course, risk sacrificing a distinct market for upstream and 
downstream priorities that adds somewhat to flexibility in planning in making more precise 
forecasts about river use and relative priority.    
E. Priority levels 
Unless otherwise determined four priority levels will exist and can be labeled as 1st 
through 4th.  Holders of 1st level priority that present themselves at a lock during a week for 
which the instrument is valid will be moved ahead of all traffic holding lower level priority. 
Notice, that under this right a 1st place holder cannot allow a lower level holder in front while 
holding back another 1st place holder.  In general, an nth level holder can move ahead of any 
n+1th level holder. 
Given the current tracking of tows between locks in place, this system would add only 
incrementally to the existing information that is now available to tows on the river.  Tows are 
currently able to access information regarding the number of tows ahead of them in the queue.  
With the priority system, they would be able to ascertain the number of tows in the queue at 
each level of priority.  In this way, they would be better able to determine whether or not they 
can profitably accept or compete over delivery conditions in a prospective contract.   
F. Limited useful life 
The instruments are good only for the time interval and lock for which the instrument 
was issued.  So, in periods without congestion, the permits will expire without being exercised.  
Unexercised permits whose valid life is past may not ever be subsequently exercised.  Of 
course, the following year, permits will be regenerated for that year according to the ownership 
of the Master Instrument. 
G. The initial number and allocation of permits 
The initial allocation of permits to operators and the number of permits for each priority 
level are related questions and, to a large extent, distributional questions beyond the scope of 
this inquiry.  A sensible starting point for such a discussion, however, is historical use and 
capacities.  According to Tietenberg (2003), this type of grandfathering tends to be the most 
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common allocation method for tradable permit systems.21  Historical capacities under various 
conditions can provide some insight into the number of lockages that can be accomplished 
under extreme operating conditions.  Similarly, one can have insights into the length of time 
that might be required to clear a queue built up during a complete closure.  Finally, patterns of 
use by particular firms offer some indications as to their scale and, perhaps, the type of 
transport service they offer.   
Using this background, as a starting point for the discussion, we might begin with the 
number of permits at the highest priority equal to the available capacity, number of lockages 
that can be accomplished, during the relevant time period when congestion is at its highest 
levels, barring complete closure for the entire period.  The relevant time interval should be 
wide enough to offer the flexibility that vessel operators demand.  A starting point might be a 
window of two weeks.  To increase flexibility, the priority permits would have overlapping 
time intervals.  Master instruments and the priority permits they produce could be evenly 
divided across two cycles that are staggered by one week.  Half the master instruments will 
produce permit streams that have their first two-week permit begin on January 1 and the other 
half will have their first begin on January 8.  See figure 1 below. 
Figure 1:  Overlapping time intervals 
December January 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Cycle 1
Cycle 2  
 
The initial distribution would be relatively conservative in that the number of higher level 
priorities would be relatively low.  This conservatism would be in order to avoid the need to 
downgrade priorities during the preliminary stages in which some adjustment might be 
required.  A conservative starting distribution might, e.g., involve only 5 percent of the 
priorities being granted at each of the three most preferred levels of priority.    
A likely solution to the distributional question would include “grandfathering” the 
existing operators in the sense that the existing operators receive the priority permits free of 
charge, or perhaps for a small administrative fee.  If all else were equal, equity might suggest 
                                                 
21 Tietenberg (2003), p. 410. 
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that each firm receive a proportional share of standard portfolios.  For example, a firm with x 
percent of the lockages over the last three years will receive x percent of the issue of each type 
of permit.  Those whose business models benefit from a greater than proportional share of 
higher priority permits would be expected to acquire them on the market from those who derive 
less value from them. 
The number of permits and number of the level of priorities present an interesting 
tradeoff.  With a very high number of priorities and low number of permits of each type, one 
might observe that, for all intents and purposes, the permits of the same priority all sell for 
much the same price.  Firms may not be willing to pay substantially more to be first as opposed 
to second.  However, this degree of fineness also makes it more difficult to make the initial 
distribution of instruments more equitable, that is, that all firms with substantial participation 
get at least one master instrument for each lock they use at each level of priority.  If there were 
10 firms that all used the same lock and only three master instruments of the highest priority, an 
apparently equitable initial distribution might not be possible.  So, the number of permits is 
generally not less than the number of firms with substantial participation at the lock.  
Moreover, larger numbers of master instruments ease trade among the participants and make 
pricing more distinct as between priorities. 
Ultimately, the initial distribution of permits involves complex questions of equity 
among the operators that lie beyond the scope of the question of the effect that such a system 
would have if implemented.  While the factors mentioned above offer some guidance as to the 
considerations that would be addressed, the process of arriving at a consensus on an equitable 
distribution is largely a political one.  However, we can add to this list of factors an adjustment 
rule for the total number of licenses at each level of priority.  The rule, developed in detail in 
Appendix B, is based on a comparison of the cost of congestion to the relative prices of the 
permits.  If the difference between the high and low priority permits exceeds the cost of 
congestion, then adding a permit at the highest level would be efficiency enhancing. 
H. Recording System 
Each master instrument and associated two-week permit is numbered; a record of the 
owner will be kept by the Corps and made publicly available.  These numbers will relate so that 
each two-week permit can be associated with the master instrument that produced it and the 
time period for which it is valid.  For example, the master instrument might be AAA111 and 
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the two-week permit transfers of ownership are valid only after official notification to the 
Corps.  The record of ownership held by the Corps will be the determining factor in the case of 
disputes, suspected fraud, forgery, or other suspected misuses.  
I. Enforcement 
The ownership of the master instrument and associated permits will be kept by the 
Corps and be available to both lock masters and any vessel that might wish to offer to purchase 
a priority permit from another operator.   
The lock master will direct repositioning of tows in accord with the permits held by 
those who might approach the lock and state they are exercising a priority permit.  This can be 
done in accordance with current practice and the existing tracking and communication systems.  
The lock master will verify the number of the certificate held by the operator using the lock.  
The nature and punishment for violations and failure to comply will be determined by the 
Corps.  The exercise of any priority permit is conditioned on it being possible to safely alter the 
queue based on all the prevailing facts and circumstances. 
V.  POLICY TESTBED 
While the policy is based on fundamental principles of economics that are fully 
understood by the scientific community and professional economists, these principles might be 
unfamiliar to those who will be affected by the recommendation.  In order to illustrate the 
nature of the proposed institution, the problems it addresses and how it accomplishes a solution 
an experimental testbed was conducted.  This testbed serves as both an illustration of the 
recommendation together with an explanation of why and how it is expected to work.  The 
concepts and the setting are complex; so, the testbed demonstration within a highly simplified 
setting should help to develop an understanding of the recommendation.  The simplicity of the 
setting is necessary to expose the operation of the underlying economics that is not 
compromised by additional complexity. 
A. Questions for the policy testbed 
The policy proposal suggests important questions that can be answered in the context of 
the policy testbed. 
• First, can the proposed market system be practical in the sense that it can be put into 
operation?  
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• Second, are the principles on which the proposed system is based apparent in the 
testbed such that the proposed system works for understandable reasons?   
• Third, when implemented, does the proposed market system have the expected effects?   
The construction and implementation of the testbed requires operational and measurable 
concepts; so, the very creation of the testbed provides an affirmative answer to the first 
question.  By observing the proposed system at work in the simple case of the testbed, we 
would hope to see that participants who are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of economics 
can nevertheless develop a common sense intuition of the proposed system’s foundations as 
evidenced by their ability to successfully use the new market instruments to improve their 
performance without extensive training.  Of course, the final question is answered by the results 
of the testbed. 
Consistent with our purposes, we use a straightforward design that begins with a “first-
come-first-served” environment that operates for several periods.  Then the environment is 
changed by an implementation of priority permits.  This design permits the study of the 
operation of the basic principles in the context of an environment in which congestion can 
operated to dampen efficiency and a comparison of that environment within the context of a 
different set of institutions that are designed to remove important aspects of congestion cost.   
B. The Testbed Environment 
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, assume that there are 9 operators, each of 
which own and operate 5 vessels, or tug-barge combinations.  All of these operators have 
opportunities to make contracts to move barges of cargo through a lock.  The current capacity 
of the lock, which may be interpreted as an impaired capacity, is insufficient to allow passage 
of all 45 vessels on the same “day.”  Only 9 lockages are possible on a given day, so the 
passage of all vessels takes 5 days to complete.  As all vessels are idle and need to move 
through the lock to complete a contract, there is an excess demand for lockages and a queue 
will form and most of the vessels will experience some degree of delay. 
The testbed proceeds in terms of a number of fixed time periods.  Each period 
represents five days and sufficient time to complete all contracts.22  The first 10 periods of the 
                                                 
(continued...)  
22 Of course, if we allowed for the recontracting of vessels that had completed their journey through the lock, we 
would increase the total number of voyages possible and the profits of the system.  However, the increase in the 
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testbed have the participants operating under a “first-come-first-served” regime.  Each subject 
controls five vessels that arrive in random order at the lock.   
Table 1
Delay, Contract Type and Contract Value
Day on which the boat passes through the lock
Contract 
Type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
A 1,000 0 -100 -500 -750
B 500 400 0 -100 -200
C 400 300 200 0 -100
D 300 200 100 100 100
---------------------------------(value)---------------------------------
 
Table 1 contains the value of various contracts as depending on delivery time.  As can 
be seen from the values in Table 1, the contracts available differ in payoff and risk dimensions.  
Contracts of type A have a relatively large payoff if the delivery time is short.  Notice, 
however, that the losses from delays in completing this type of contract are also relatively large 
and increases with the length of the delay.  Contracts of type B produce a substantially lower 
payoff than those of type A if delivery is relatively quick; however, the loss exposure is also 
not as great due to delay.  For contracts of type C, the payoff for a quick delivery is reduced as 
are the penalties for delay.  Contracts of type D are “safe” contracts, in that it has a similar 
expected payoff to type C with random delivery times, but does not involve any negative values 
regardless of the length of the delay. 
Opportunities to engage in different forms of contracts differed dramatically across 
vessel operators.  In particular, one-third of the operators had the opportunity to engage in type 
A contracts while others did not.  The reason for this asymmetry was to illustrate how the 
patterns of profits would be affected across vessel owners with different shipping opportunities.  
Different opportunities may be the result of different business relationships or the particular 
capabilities of the vessels themselves.   
                                                                                                                                                           
(...continued)  
value of those additional lockages would be approximately proportionate to the ones we observe and would not 
alter the qualitative results of these preliminary tests.  Part of the payoff structure in the contracts can be 
interpreted as relating to opportunities for additional contracts on the other side of the lock. 
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Theory tells us, basically, that the benefits of the proposed policy will accrue neutrally 
in the sense that the benefits of the policy will tend to be equally shared among existing 
operators regardless of any differences they may have in their opportunity set.  The testbed 
allows a means of supporting this prediction if all the vessel owners’ profits increase, 
notwithstanding the fact that only one-third of them had the ability to make contracts of type A.   
The proposed system includes an even distribution of priority permits to all operators in 
proportion to historical river use but independent of the nature of that use.  Thus, each operator 
will receive a portfolio that included instruments for all levels of priority.  Operators who do 
not have openings to markets with high payoff contracts are able to sell these priorities to those 
who do and thereby share in the gains.   
VI.  A MODEL OF PERMIT PRICES 
The implications of the apparent market realities and economic principles upon which 
the proposed policy is based, the competition equilibrium model, can best be understood by 
first considering a continuous model.  We assume that each agent is of a fixed size (e.g., limited 
number of vessels (or tug-barge combinations)) and can deploy a vessel only once during the 
time frame under consideration.   
The notation used throughout will be as follows: 
m = the number of agents 
n = the number of different types of permits 
xij = the number of jth priority permits held by agent i 
xi = (xi1, .., xin) 
pj = the equilibrium price of jth level permit 
BBi = the number of vessels owned by agent i (i.e., the size of i’s fleet) 
vi(xi) = the value that agent i placed on the portfolio of priority merits xi. 
sj = The fixed market supply of level j priority permits. 
The market supply quantities could be considered as having been distributed as intended 
endowments and no confusion would follow except possibly when overall profits are computed 
and at that time the assumptions will be made clear. 
The theory of competitive equilibrium has agents solving the problem: 
max vi(xi) –  ∑ , 
=
n
ij
jij xp
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different levels of priority is the difference in profitability of the marginal unit.)  
In the discrete world of the testbed, the equilibrium allocation and prices are as in Table 2. 
Table 2
Equilibrium For Competition Model Given Testbed Environment
Permit Regime Permit Price
Contract 
Type
Cargo 
Value
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
First Come, First Served
No Permits 0 D 100
Priority Permits
1st priority 900 A 1,000
2nd priority 300 B 400
3rd priority 100 C 200
4th priority 0 D 100
 
The information content of equilibrium prices includes the value of increase of the lock 
capacity.  The following example taken from Table 2 illustrates the principle. An increase in 
lock capacity will increase commodity flow up to the resource constraint imposed by the 
number of vessels.  All vessels are fully utilized in the test so an increase in lock capacity will 
not increase the total number of shipments but it will change the composition of shipments. The 
following changes will take place, theoretically, if the capacity is increased to let one more 
vessel through the lock under first priority conditions.  First, one vessel will stop shipping with 
a permit of priority two and instead use a permit with priority one.  In so doing, it will stop 
making contracts of type B and begin making contracts of type A.  The implied gain from this 
change is 600.  Second, another vessel will stop shipping a C under priority three and acquire 
the second priority that has become free.  This leads to a gain of 200.  Subsequently, a third 
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vessel will move from the shipping of a D contract to a shipping of a C contract, creating a gain 
of 100. The remaining vessels will continue to ship D contracts, leaving the gain unchanged.  
The total gain therefore is 600+200+100, or 900.  The value of increasing the lock size to 
accommodate one additional priority one permit equals 900, i.e. the price of the priority one 
certificate.  
Likewise, suppose the lock capacity is increased to allow one more of all classes of 
priority to be used.  The gain is one more priority one permit, creating a shift from a D contract 
to an A contract, leading to a gain of 900; additionally, there is one more priority two permit, 
creating a shift from a D contract to a B with a gain of 300, and one more priority three permit, 
leading to a shift from a D contract to a C contract, creating a gain of 100.  Finally, all vessels 
are used so there is no additional traffic of cargo D.  The total gain is therefore 900+300+100, 
or 1300.  The sum of prices is also 900+300+100, or 1300.  Thus, priority prices can be used to 
compute the implicit value of increasing the lock size.  Of course if additional vessels are free 
and if the increase in lock capacity means that three more D could be processed by the lock 
then that gain can be added to the benefit calculation.  
VII.  RESULTS 
The first 10 periods of the testbed were under a policy of “first-come-first-served.”  
Beginning in period 11, a system of priorities was implemented.23  The results of this first 
treatment of the testbed relative to the second confirm that the delays, directly and through the 
associated uncertainty, have an impact on the type of contracts made by operators.  We have 
five principal results.  The first result addresses the types of contracts chosen and the second 
result addresses the economic value produced by contracts and how the value changes as 
institutions change.  The third result is focused on prices.  The fourth and fifth results report the 
impact of policies on the size and distribution of profits. 
RESULT 1.  The risk of lock delay impacts the nature of the cargo and contracts transported 
through the river system. The “first-come-first-served” policy discourages high value contracts 
with fast delivery requirements. The introduction of the priority permit policy is accompanied 
by an immediate change in the types of contracts shipped from the low valued contracts to the 
high valued contracts.   
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Figure 2 demonstrates the contracts chosen over time. The policy change takes effect 
for period 12, with period 11 as a period of transition and instruction.  As can be seen in figure 
2, above, the shift in the type of contracts characterizing cargo is immediate.  The use of the 
most valuable types of contracts, those of types A and B, are increasing from zero while the use 
of the least valuable types of contract, those of type D, plummets. Again, such evolution of 
markets takes place over time reflecting the long range investment decisions. 
During the first 10 periods, the contracts with the least potential economic value, those 
of type D, swell in use while the contracts with the most potential economic value, those of 
types A and B, essentially disappear from use in the market.  For our purposes, this diminished 
use of types A and B contracts can be thought of as representing business lost to other forms of 
transportation, perhaps in the form of technology and location decisions to base businesses on 
transportation footings other than river traffic. 
Under the “first-come-first-served” policy, then, these contracts of high potential value 
and high-risk appear to be avoided in favor of low potential value and low-risk contracts.   
Figure 2: Number of Contracts Made by Type
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(...continued)  
23 However, in period 11 there were technical problems and the data were not used.   
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The number of transportation contracts executed each period was 45 for most periods.  
The only exceptions were the first period and the first period after the introduction of the 
permits. However, a change in the types of contracts shipped occurs almost immediately with 
the introduction of the tradable priority permits.  This can be viewed statistically as the 
distribution of contracts shifting away from the low-risk low-reward contracts of type D in 
favor of the higher valued but riskier contracts of type A and B with the introduction of the 
tradable permits.  In particular, the higher value contracts, which also have higher penalties for 
delay, were executed more frequently when the uncertainty was removed by the priority permit, 
while the contracts that have little variance in their value based on the time of delivery were 
executed less frequently.   
The mean number of contracts for each type both before and after the introduction of 
tradable permits is provided in Table 3.  Difference in means tests for each pair confirm that 
contracts of types A, B, and C were executed more frequently and contracts of type D were 
executed less frequently after the tradable permits were introduced, while the total number of 
contracts executed remains essentially constant. 
Table 3: Difference of Means Tests for the Number of Transportation Contracts 
Executed by Type
Contract Types
A B C D Total
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Mean Before Permit Trading 1.2 4.0 4.8 34.8 44.8
Mean After Permit Trading 8.7 9.3 8.6 18.4 45.0
t-Statistic -12.637 -5.239 -3.138 7.760 -1.000
Ho: Diff = 0
Prob Ha1: 0.000 0.000 0.003 1.000 0.165
Prob Ha2: 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.331
Prob Ha3: 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.000 0.835
)( Bx
)( Ax
0)( >− BA xx
0)( ≠− BA xx
0)( <− BA xx
 
The next result, Result 2, provides intuition for the dramatic shift in the type of contract 
used.  The key resides in the realized values of the contracts.  While A and B contracts have 
higher potential value, they are also associated with a higher risk of loss due to delay.  As might 
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be expected, in periods of congestion the delay reduces the average return realized for the 
contract.  The high risk contracts are not profitable because operators can not respond to the 
congestion by reducing the uncertainty associated with their arrival time and their expected 
delay.  Therefore, operators respond instead by choosing contracts that have higher economic 
value when delays are encountered, i.e., D contracts.   
The patterns of use observed in Figure 2 reflect the relative risk.   Contracts of type B, 
which are low risk compared with those of type A, are initially made; however, experience with 
losses forces that type of contract from the market.  Use of C contracts, which have still lower 
risk, is also attempted but are less favored than contracts of type D, which have a similar 
expected payoff and a better worst case.  Within the “first-come-first-served” regime there is no 
mechanism through which operators can capture the value of contracts A, B and C.  So, the use 
of these types of contracts all but disappears.  
Figure 3: Average Realized Value of Contracts by Type
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The realized value of a contract is dependent on the time of delivery. The introduction 
of a system of tradable priorities has the clear effect of increasing the frequency with which 
higher value contract types are successful in arriving on time and thus increases both the 
expected and realized value of such contracts.   This change in the realized value is captured by 
the second result. 
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RESULT 2.  The average realized value of the more time-sensitive contracts increased with the 
introduction of tradable permits, while the average realized value of the relatively low-value 
and less time-sensitive contracts of type D fell.   
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the policy of tradable priority permits on the realized 
value of contracts.  The realized value of contracts is determined by the day on which the vessel 
carrying the contract’s cargo clears the lock in accordance with the values in Table 1.  As noted 
above, contracts of type A are penalized heavily for delays at the lock.  In the absence of 
priority permits, the realized value of contract A is negative and the realized value of contract B 
has a high variance and is declining. The realized value of contract D is positive and without 
variance and the realized value of contract C is similarly positive with some variance.    
With the introduction of priority permits, the average realized values of the contracts 
take on a more stable set of relationships and, most notably the average realized value of type D 
contracts declines.  Since the payoff structure of D contracts does not provide a sufficient 
incentive for the use of higher level priority permits, vessels executing type D contracts are 
more frequently locking through on the later days where the realized values are lower once the 
permits are introduced.  The realized value of type A contracts begin with a negative average 
realized value and a frequency of use diminishing to zero; however, with the introduction of 
priority permits, they have the highest average realized value and steady and substantial use.  
The number of D type contracts, which had experienced an increase in use prior to the 
introduction of the tradable permits, falls off with the introduction of the tradable permits to be 
replaced by an increased use of contracts of types A, B and C. 
The visual impression of Figure 3 and the associated discussion are supported and made 
more precise with the statistical tests presented in Table 4.  The differences in average realized 
values of contracts before and after the introduction of priority permits are statistically 
significant in all cases. 
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Table 4: Difference of Means Tests for the Value of Transportation Contracts Executed 
by Type
Contract Types
A B C D Total
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Mean Before Permit Trading -270.0 680.0 890.0 5610.0 6910.0
Mean After Permit Trading 8,550.0 3,700.0 1,620.0 1,860.0 15,730.0
t-Statistic -27.525 -9.959 -3.089 10.890 -26.943
Ho: Diff = 0
Prob Ha1: 0.000 0.000 0.003 1.000 0.000
Prob Ha2: 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
Prob Ha3: 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.000 1.000
)( Bx
)( Ax
0)( >− BA xx
0)( ≠− BA xx
0)( <− BA xx
 
The results of the testbed support the idea that the proposed policy produces exactly the 
type of results that the underlying principles indicate should result.  Result 3 that follows, helps 
focus on exactly how it happened and why it happens.  In particular, the next three figures 
demonstrate that the mechanism through which the policy operates can be well understood in 
terms of basic economic principles.  The operators acquire the priority permits before soliciting 
the types of contracts they ship.  Thus, with a permit of priority one, an operator is guaranteed a 
faster passage and can more safely enter into higher value types of contracts.  The potential 
value of the contracts creates value for the permits and thus becomes reflected in the permit 
prices.  Only those whose shipping plans can benefit from the higher priority will pay the high 
price for a permit of priority one.   
The laws of supply and demand tell us exactly what those prices should be.  Relying on 
these laws, we can determine the equilibrium prices for each permit type and use these as 
predictions to compare with the results of the testbed. 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 contain the data on the price of each of the contract types over time.  
The prices converge over time toward the prices predicted by the laws of supply and demand. 
Specifically, the price of permits of priority one converges toward the predicted equilibrium 
price of 900.  Similarly, the prices of permits of priorities two and three converge to their 
predicted prices.  In the testbed, permits of priorities four and five traded at an insufficient 
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volume to justify a figure; they command a price of zero, which is consistent with the basic 
principles.  
 
Figure 4: Market for Priority 1 Permits After Priority Permit 
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Figure 5: Market for Priority 2 Permits After Priority Permit 
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Figure 6: Market for Priority 3 Permits After Priority Permit 
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RESULT 3. Permit prices evolve toward those consistent with basic principles of economics.  
The figures above carry the impression that the prices are converging to the competitive 
equilibrium of the system.  The statistics make that intuition precise.  Following Noussair, 
Plott, and Riezman (1995) and (1997), we can use an Ashenfelter-El Gamal (“AEG”) model for 
the price convergence for permits at each level of priority as follows:   
tt ut
tB
t
Bz +−+= 11 21 , 
where zt is the price of permits of a given level of priority in period t, BB1 is the point of origin 
for the evolving market price, B2B  is the asymptotes towards which the market price has 
converged, and ut is an error term.   
We ran three regressions based on this model, one for each market.  Using a Newey-
West procedure, the standard errors are robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation.  The market for permits of the lowest priority level did not involve a sufficient 
number of transactions; however, the results for priority levels 1, 2 and 3 are presented below 
in Table 5.  The estimated asymptotes for the prices for each level of priority are 660, 294, and 
79, respectively.  These estimates have the same rank and similar values to those of the 
theoretical predictions of 900, 300, and 100.   
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Table 5:  Regression Results for the Permit Prices of 
Each Priority Level
Priority 
Level of 
Permit
Number of 
Observations Origin Asymptote
Theoretical 
Equilibrium 
Price
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 10 399.923 * 663.513 * 900
(39.464) (45.014)
2 10 260.639 * 292.084 * 300
(4.493) (2.835)
3 10 56.514 * 75.632 * 100
(15.040) (10.830)
Notes: - Standard Errors are listed in parentheses.
* Number is significant at the 0.01 level.  
Another way to view the value created by the introduction of the priority permits is 
through system efficiency measures.  The system is 100 percent efficient if system wealth is 
maximized.  This is the standard cost-benefit measure applied to the testbed environment. As 
the next result, Result 4, demonstrates, the proposed policy accomplishes that goal.  By 
measuring system efficiency under both the “first-come-first-served” system and under the 
system of priority permits we are able to measure the value created by the system of priority 
permits and see that this value creation is a direct result of economic efficiency enhancement. 
Since the parameters of the environment are known, via the construction of the testbed, 
we can determine the “socially optimal” (in a cost-benefit sense) pattern of contracts.  The 
social optimum is almost immediately obtained once the priority permits are instituted.  Not 
only does contracting shift to the optimal distribution; the shipments are coordinated in an 
optimal queue for processing through the lock.  Recalling that Type A contracts have a value of 
1,000 when they clear on the first day, we see in Figure 3 that they are processed on the first 
day of the period, those of type B on the second day of the period, and so on.  The coordination 
optimizes industry profits and the overall value of river use.     
RESULT 4.  The priority permit system operates to maximize total profits of operators. The 
system operates at 100 percent efficiency from a cost-benefit measure. Both the “first-come-
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first-served” and the priority system are near the predictions of the models when applied to the 
two systems. 
Figure 7 contains total system profits, the sum of all operators’ profits for each period. 
The first 10 periods are profits under the “first-come-first-served” system and from period 
eleven on the system is operating under the priority system.  Two facts are apparent from figure 
7.  First, the system performance is almost exactly as predicted by basic economic principles.  
Clearly, the models capture the essence of what is taking place in these complex interactions.   
Secondly, total profits increase dramatically with the introduction of the proposed policy.   
This increase in wealth comes from two sources of increased system efficiency:  (1) the 
processing of the shipments at the lock reflects the relative time value of the cargo and (2) the 
increased value due to the reduction of uncertainty.  The former reflects the decentralized, self 
organizing process of markets in which the cargo with the greatest time value is shipped with 
the highest priority.  The shippers do this as a natural part of managing their affairs.  With the 
latter, shippers are able to engage in contracts of a different sort that have a greater dependence 
on time value.  Thus, the cargo shipped in general under the Priority Permit system has greater 
value due to the removal of the uncertainty.  Under the first come first serve system the 
uncertainty forces shippers to compromise by choosing to engage in contracts that have less 
time sensitivity and less overall value. 
Figure 7: Total Profits to All Shippers
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Beginning with the same basic AEG model for profits as we used for prices, we add an 
interaction term to measure any change in the asymptote in periods with the tradable permits 
relative to those without the tradable permits, i.e.,  
tt ut
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where d is a dummy variable that is equal to one in periods with tradable permits and yt is the 
total profits for each period of all the participants in the testbed.  The results of this regression, 
again with robust standard errors, are reported in Table 6.  We observe that the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term is both positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
the introduction of the tradable permits increased the expected period profits for the group as a 
whole. 
The final result is with respect to the distribution of the benefits and answers the 
question:  To whom does all of the increase in wealth accumulate?  The answer to this question 
is closely tied to the manner in which the initial distribution of permits is made among the 
operators. 
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Table 6: Regression Results for Total Profits and Profits for 
Each Individual
Participants
Number of 
Observations Origin Asymptote Permit Effect
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Total 20 -10,238.58 56,210.65 * 110,848.60 *
(13,435.52) (9,595.38) (28,868.04)
1 20 -1,687.38 6,405.59 * 20,192.37 *
(1,959.01) (1,233.32) (4,884.47)
2 20 -119.94 7,453.41 * 10,118.48 *
(1,195.55) (909.11) (2,693.97)
3 20 -815.36 6,503.94 * 10,497.02 *
(1,410.36) (1,110.70) (2,604.58)
4 20 -1,625.09 3,417.04 * 14,503.39 *
(1,507.42) (833.32) (4,109.75)
5 20 -467.40 6,237.97 * 9,943.04 *
(1,273.80) (931.88) (2,735.33)
6 20 -873.45 7,623.18 * 11,036.06 *
(1,494.41) (1,179.80) (2867.84)
7 20 -2,695.18 4,415.44 * 13,036.69 *
(1,684.20) (1,297.69) (3,366.79)
8 20 -1,088.56 7,074.67 * 10,495.06 *
(1,566.77) (1,151.54) (2,874.91)
9 20 -866.23 7,079.41 * 11,026.53 *
(1,378.68) (977.43) (2,824.90)
Notes: - Standard Errors are listed in parentheses.
- Permit Effect = Permit Dummy  * ((t-1)/t).
* Number is significant at the 0.01 level.  
RESULT 5. The distribution of profit opportunities is distributed equitably among the existing 
shippers so that the wealth created by the introduction of the priority permit system is shared 
equitably among them. 
Figure 8 contains the accumulated profits for each of the shippers over the time of the 
testbed.  They all grow at about an equal rate.  All increase and none decrease.  Even with fairly 
balanced growth, we can see that one operator’s profits grew somewhat faster, due to the 
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aggressive purchase permits of priority one when their price was low relative to market value.  
This shipper recognized the potential and was an early catalyst in developing the most lucrative 
market.  Since all shippers had a portfolio that included some of all priorities of permits, those 
who were not able to actively participate in the taking of higher valued contracts were able to 
profit nonetheless by the sale of their permits of priority one, two and three and then specialize 
in the lower priority cargo opportunities that were available to them.  
Figure 8: Accumulated Profits by Individual Shippers After Priority 
Permit Trading Begins 
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regressors for common origin and initial asymptote but adding individual interactions between 
a dummy variable that is equal to one for periods of tradable permits for observations relating 
to subject i and zero elsewhere and (t-1)/t.  The results are presented in Table 7.  The estimated 
coefficient for every participant is positive and statistically significant.  Thus, the asymptotic 
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Table 7: Regression Results for Profits of the Individual Testbed 
Participants Before and After the Introduction of Tradable Permits
Regressors
Number of 
Observations
Coefficient 
Values
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Origin 180 0.7765 0.9204 -1,137.62 **
(559.63)
Asymptote 180 0.7765 0.9204 6,245.63 *
(424.35)
Permit Effect 
for Individual:
1 180 0.7765 0.9204 20,313.04 *
(3,893.49)
2 180 0.7765 0.9204 11,398.98 *
(2,089.42)
3 180 0.7765 0.9204 10,778.36 *
(1,897.13)
4 180 0.7765 0.9204 11,639.97 *
(3,342.86)
5 180 0.7765 0.9204 9,983.28 *
(2,121.65)
6 180 0.7765 0.9204 12,432.50 *
(2,119.86)
7 180 0.7765 0.9204 11,095.19 *
(2,514.08)
8 180 0.7765 0.9204 11,327.61 *
(2,153.80)
9 180 0.7765 0.9204 11,879.71 *
(2,185.60)
Notes: - Standard Errors are listed in parentheses.
- Permit Effect = Permit Dummy  * ((t-1)/t).
* Number is significant at the 0.01 level.
** Number is significant at the 0.05 level.
2R2R
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VIII.  SUMMARY 
The proposed policy does not increase lock capacity, nor can it change the peak load 
aspect of the system in the upper Mississippi.  While the proposed policy does increase the 
economic value associated with river commerce by reducing the cost associated with 
congestion, it does not decrease the amount of river traffic or increase the number of possible 
lockages.  Some measure of congestion will likely remain in the system when demand is 
relatively high, but the delays associated with that congestion will be less costly.  That is, the 
policy increases the value of the use of the river to all parties.  Moreover, the market prices of 
the priority permits provide a measure of the value of avoiding those delays and, therefore, to 
reducing congestion. 
The proposal is made using some terms of art from economics but no language here is 
intended to take account of the legal or regulatory definitions that might be part of the 
surrounding legislation and administration.  The instructions used in the preliminary testing of 
the model were written so that a reader applying the ordinary meaning of the words would 
understand the economic setting and their role and incentives.  Should this proposal be formally 
adopted, the implementation should include a legal review to avoid any unintended confusion.  
Of course, every effort has been taken by those involved to avoid any such confusion. 
31 
SELECTED REFERENCES 
Anderson, Robert C., National Center for Environmental Economics, Office of Policy, 
Economics, and Innovation, Office of the Administrator, The United States Experience 
with Economic Incentive for Protecting the Environment, Washington: United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-240-R-01-001 (January 1, 2001). 
CBFenton, Panama Canal Vessel Transit Reservation System, 
http://www.cbfenton.com/book2.htm, accessed on November 11, 2005. 
Committee to Review the Upper Mississippi River-Illinois Waterway Navigation System 
Feasibility Study; Water Science and Technology Board; Division on Earth and Life 
Studies; Transportation Research Board; National Research Council, “Inland 
Navigation System Planning: The Upper Mississippi River—Illinois Waterway.”  
National Academy Press, Washington DC (2001). 
Cox, James C., Theo Offerman, Mark A. Olson, and Arthur J. H. C. Schram, “Competition for 
versus on the rails: A laboratory experiment,” International Economic Review, 
43:3(709-736), August 2002. 
Grether, David M., R. Mark Isaac, and Charles R. Plott, “The Allocation of Landing Rights by 
Unanimity Among Competitors,” The American Economic Review, 71:2(166-171), May 
1981. 
Hong, James T. and Charles R. Plott, “Rate filing policies for inland water transportation:  an 
experimental approach,” The Bell Journal of Economics 13:1(1-19), Spring 1982. 
Montero, Juan Pablo, “Markets for Environmental Protection: Design and Performance,” 
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Instituto de Economia, Documento de Trabajo 
No. 269, August 2004. 
Noussair, Charles N., Charles R. Plott, and Raymond G. Riezman, “An Experimental 
Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade,” The American Economic Review, 
85:3(462-491), June 1995. 
Noussair, Charles N., Charles R. Plott, and Raymond G. Riezman, “The Principles of Exchange 
Rate Determination in an International Finance Experiment,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 105:4(822-861), 1997. 
Planning Center for Expertise for Inland Navigation, Huntington District, “Shipper and Carrier 
Response to the September-October 2003 Greenup Main Lock Closure,” US Army 
Corps of Engineers, Great Lakes and Ohio River Division, February 2005.  
http://www.corpsnets.us/docs/EventGreenup/Greenup%20Survey%20RptD.pdf.  
Accessed on April 8, 2005. 
Plott, Charles R., “Market architectures, institutional landscapes and testbed experiments,” 
Economic Theory 4(3-10), 1994. 
Plott, Charles R. and David P. Porter, “Market architectures and institutional testbedding: An 
experiment with space station pricing policies,” Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 31(237-272), 1996. 
Stavins, Robert N, “Market-based environmental policies: what can we learn from U.S. 
experience (and related research)?,” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 03-43, 
August 2003. 
“The Nightmare Continues,” The Economist, October 13, 2005. 
Tietenberg, Tom, “The tradable-permits approach to protecting the commons: lessons for 
climate change,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19:3(400-419), 2003. 
Tirschwell, Peter, “A way to alleviate congestion?,” Journal of Commerce, March 14, 2005. 
32 
US Army Corps of Engineers Meeting, “Temporary Closure of McAlpine Lock,” Louisville, 
Kentucky, May 27, 2004.  http://www.lrl.usace.army.mil/pa/article.asp?id=83.  
Accessed on May 19, 2005. 
Volpe, John A., National Transportation Systems Center; Research and Special Programs 
Administration; U.S. Department of Transportation, Upper Mississippi River and 
Illinois Waterways: Non-Structural Measures Cost-Benefit Study, Cambridge, MA, 
May 2003. 
Watson, Rip (Bloomberg News), “Rail Congestion halts Michigan plant: Transportation 
demand increases due to growing economy, Asian imports,” The Detroit News, July 15, 
2004. 
Wilson, Robert B., Nonlinear Pricing, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, Chapter 10. 
33 
APPENDIX A. MCALPINE CLOSURE 
On May 27, 2004, the USACE held a meeting with the industry to discuss the 
temporary closure of the McAlpine Lock on the Ohio River.  Temporary Closure of McAlpine 
Lock, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Meeting, Louisville, KY (May 27, 2004).  At that 
meeting a number of comments by industry participants highlighted both the benefits of having 
additional time to stockpile for the outage and, for some, the need for a steady and 
uninterrupted access.   
I'm $$ $$ with Century Aluminum. We have a continuous operation at 
Rangeland, West Virginia that without the feed stock, we'll shut and would not 
reopen, given the cost of starting that facility. About seven hundred employees, 
three hundred retirees at this point.  That's our northern most plant. The feed 
stock that we use along with our metal aluminum is called Alumina, and it's in 
tight supply world wide, as a matter of fact it's selling at two-and-a-half times 
what it sold at a year ago. We can't surge and pull ahead very quickly. In our 
instance, the longer we can put this off, the better, understanding that you do 
need to get it fixed. So for us, if we were down in June, it would be catastrophic.  
See p. 34. 
Ms. $$ with Ormet Corporation. It's impossible to mobilize the supply in that 
time frame. $$'s supply, what he's talking about, is at least thirty days away from 
that lock right now, even if we were in a position to put enough on the river to 
basically cover a three-week time frame. First, we have to have our suppliers 
basically mobilize their supply in order to get the time frame to start moving the 
product into the river and through the position. If you close that lock, with even 
a two-week notice, we still have no potential to get the material up the river and 
through that lock before we would then have – be out of material. So the longer 
we have, the more notice we have -- you know, basically, ninety days notice 
would even be better, because it would give our suppliers a chance to get 
material to us.  …  Well, we have the same number of employees that $$ has. 
We have at least a thousand hourly employees between two facilities and if we 
put both that and a rolling mill in danger, $$'s plant produces product for the 
U.S. government that they basically need for planes for the materials for the war 
efforts. So, I mean, this puts the government at risk also for critical materials.  
See pp. 34-36. 
My name is $$ $$ with Bayer Corporation in Pittsburgh. We have a 
manufacturing plant in South Charleston, West Virginia. Key raw material will 
be dock side and we're a hundred percent dependent on that product for 
manufacture of polypropylene glycol. About ninety plus percent of the content 
of polypropylene glycol is propylene oxide. We are one hundred percent 
dependent on the river for this supply. We have no other mode of transportation 
other than barge. Propylene oxide is also tight around the world at this time and 
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it would take us at least until August to build up sufficient inventories of both 
raw materials and finished goods to get through the fourteen-day outage. 
Anything beyond the fourteen days, we feel would be – would have a significant 
impact on our company resulting in millions of dollars of loss for us, shut down 
of dozens of industries, including key manufacturing companies in the U.S. and 
the American automotive industry. That industry, we are a key supplier to that 
and that is an industry that does not have any wide spots in the line to absorb 
any hiccups in the supply chain.  See pp. 36-37. 
I'm $$ $$ with Lyondell Chemical and we supply Bayer with their propylene 
oxide. We're also the owner and operator of the barges that carry that material 
from our facilities back to U.S. Gulf. We do have a limited amount of these 
barges. They are specialized. We have fourteen barges in service. So it is going 
to be important not only before the closure on the loaded barges coming up from 
the U.S. gulf, but also getting barges back south, back to our plants to reload the 
empties. So we are in a situation where we have a limited amount of equipment 
to move this material up from West Virginia. So -- I think $$ mentioned -- 
started maybe one of the questions that we have, will there be any prioritization 
for equipment that is dedicated and needed to keep lines open?  See p. 37. 
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APPENDIX B. ADJUSTMENT RULE FOR PERMITS 
Optimum 
In this appendix, we develop an adjustment rule for adding an additional priority permit 
to the system based on a comparison of relative permit prices and a given measure of the 
congestion cost.  To begin, we characterize the optimum allocation of permits across priority 
levels such that the social value of the priorities at a lock subject to the constraint of the limited 
capacity of that lock is maximized.  Priority levels can be designated as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. and 
these levels provide access to relative positions in a queue.  That is, as the queue at a lock is 
formed, a vessel with priority i may queue up ahead of any vessel with priority j for all i<j, 
therefore, vessels with priority i may join the queue ahead of all vessels with priority j or higher 
in the queue.   
More formally, let I = {1, 2,...,n} be the levels of priority and let Xi be the number 
permits at priority level i available for use for an arbitrary and fixed period of time.  This is 
equivalent to the number of master instruments.  Let xi be the number of priority i permits “in 
use.” 
Let the private value of vessels with priority i be expressed as: 
(1)  Vi(xi, ∑j<i xj). 
 
The value of vessels with a given priority, i, decreases with increases in the number of 
vessels with a higher priority.  This is so because the vessels of priority i are forced back in the 
queue with the arrival of all vessels with a higher priority at the lock.  This relationship is the 
cost of delay caused by congestion and is included in the valuation function.  
Let the constraint of the capacity of the lock be expressed as: 
(2) ∑iєI Xi = C 
 
where C is the capacity of the lock which equals the total number of vessels that can be moved 
through the lock during the time period under consideration. 
The total social value of a pattern of lock use is given by the expression 
 
(3)  V1(x1) + V2(x2, x1) + V3(x3, x1+x2) +...+ Vn(xn, ∑h<nxh) for xi ≤ Xi. 
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The necessary conditions for optimum social welfare are found by maximizing (3) 
subject to the constraint imposed by (2).  If we assume that all priority levels are used to the 
maximum, then the conditions for the optimum number of permits in each priority level can be 
determined by finding the first order conditions for the optimum of (3) subject to (2).   These 
are: 
(4)      ∂V1/∂X1 + ∂V2/∂X1 + ∂V3/∂X1 +... + ∂Vn/∂X1 + λ = 0 
                  ∂V2/∂X2 + ∂V3/∂X2 +... + ∂Vn/∂X2 + λ = 0 
                                    ∂V3/∂X3 +... + ∂Vn/∂X3 + λ = 0 
                                                                     ... 
                                                            ∂Vn/∂Xn + λ = 0 
 
The variable λ is associated with the constraint (2) so it must be added to the set of equations 
(4)  that describe the necessary conditions for the (interior) solution.   
This optimum has a clear interpretation. Consider the equations as 
(5) ∂Vi/∂Xi = -∑k>i ∂Vk/∂Xi + ∂Vn/∂Xn  
 
which says that the marginal private value of increasing the number of permits of priority i 
should be equal to the sum of the marginal cost imposed on all lower levels of priority traffic 
(all of which are negative) plus the opportunity cost of one less permit of the lowest priority 
traffic. The latter term reflects the fact that if one more vessel with a higher priority is created 
the overall constraint of the lock requires that the number of vessels at the lowest level of 
priority moving through the lock must be decreased by one.  Its marginal value (positive) is the 
opportunity cost of the unit.  Of course, all marginal values are measured at the constrained 
optimum from which the change is considered. 
 
An analysis of the difference between two “adjacent” priority levels will be useful.  
Consider priority level i and the immediately lower level of priority level i+1.  Subtracting the 
marginal social value of level i+1 from the higher priority level i we get: 
(6)   ∂Vi/∂Xi - ∂Vi+1/∂Xi+1=-[∑k>i ∂Vk/∂Xi - ∂Vn/∂Xn] + [∑k>i+1∂Vk/∂Xi- ∂Vn/∂Xn] 
 
which is simply the value of the externality of an additional permit of priority level i on the 
adjacent priority level, i+1: 
(7)   ∂Vi/∂Xi - ∂Vi+1/∂Xi+1 = -∂Vi+1/∂Xi. 
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That is, the difference between the marginal private value of permit level i and the marginal 
private value of the lower priority level permit i+1 is the value of the externality imposed by 
the former on the latter. 
Suppose the Xi have been set at some level other than the solution to (4) and (2). In that 
case, under suitable (convexity) conditions (7) can be used as a tool to adjust the levels and 
create new levels (levels that have been heretofore constrained to have zero permits). 
 
Equilibrium 
 
The analysis proceeds as if there is a system of marginal externality charges that will be 
reflected in permit prices.  This tool will allow us to examine how permit prices interact in 
relation to the optimum. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that each agent operates with a 
variable number of vessels and the marginal cost of a vessel is reflected in the private value 
functions.  This assumption allows us to explore essential properties of the competitive 
equilibrium.  In particular, when deploying vessels the agents will adjust until the marginal 
profit opportunities of the use of a priority permit is equal to the price of the permit.   That is, 
for any agent r, the marginal profit from operating any priority level i satisfies the equation: 
 (8)  ∂Vri(xri)/∂xri = Pi . 
 
The generality of this property allows the analysis to proceed without notation specific 
to the individual agent. That is, for all i we have: 
(9) ∂Vi/∂Xi = Pi . 
 
The relationship between equilibrium expressed by (7) and the optimal number of 
permits as expressed by (5) can be seen through the application of a connecting model of 
optimal externality taxes. 
 
Policy 
 
Combining (7) and (9), and recalling that the externality of an addition permit of 
priority level i is negative, we have:   
(10)   ∂Vi/∂Xi - ∂Vi+1/∂Xi+1 = Pi - Pi+1 = -∂Vi+1/∂Xi
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This tells us that the difference in price between two adjacent priority levels should be equal to 
the marginal cost of the externality that the higher level imposes on the lower, as such is a 
property of the optimum. 
Within the context of this model, the policy implications are straightforward.  If the 
marginal cost of the crowding of a priority level on the immediate lower level is less than the 
difference between the prices – then, the number of permits of the lower level priority can be 
reduced and the number of higher level priority permits increased by the same amount.  
Similarly, if the difference in prices is less than the external congestion cost then the number of 
the higher level priority permits should be reduced and the lower level increased. 
The generalization to non-adjacent priority levels is straight forward. From (4) we can 
extract the equation for two arbitrary levels of priority to get: 
(11)   ∂Vi/∂Xi + ∂Vi+1/∂Xi + ... ∂Vi+k/∂Xi + ∂Vi+k+1/∂Xi  ... + ∂Vn/∂X1 + λ = 0 
          ∂Vi+k/∂Xi+k + ∂Vi+k+1/∂Xi+k + ∂Vi+k+2/∂Xi+k + ... + ∂Vn/∂Xi+k + λ = 0. 
 
Asking about the difference in marginal private values we get: 
 
(12)  ∂Vi/∂Xi - ∂Vi+k/∂Xi+k = -[∂Vi+1/∂Xi + ... + ∂Vi+k/∂Xi +∂Vi+k+1/∂Xi  ... + ∂Vn/∂X1 + λ] + 
[∂Vi+k+1/∂Xi+k + ∂Vi+k+2/∂Xi+k + ... + ∂Vn/∂Xi+k + λ] 
 
Let us assume the marginal congestion cost on a lower level of priority is the same for 
all higher levels of priority – and this assumption appears natural since all vessels with higher 
levels of priority must be cleared from the queue before those with a lower level have access to 
the lock. Those on a lower level must wait the same amount of time regardless of the order in 
which the higher levels of priority are served.  The assumption is  
(13)   ∂Vk/∂Xi = ∂Vk/∂Xr = qk  for all i, r < k. 
 
Substituting and collecting the terms of (12) we have: 
(14)   ∂Vi/∂Xi - ∂Vi+k/∂Xi+k = - ∑i+1i+k qr . 
 
Using (9) again we have: 
(15)   Pi - Pi+k = - ∑i+1i+k qr. 
 
In sum, this model suggests an additional permit of priority level i be added if the 
difference in the price of a permit of that level and the price of a permit at the lowest level of 
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priority is greater than the sum of the congestion cost imposed by an additional permit of 
priority level i on permit holders of all levels of priority less than i. 
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